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ABSTRACT
Traditional underground utility construction and rehabilitation methods entail
cutting open the ground which not only disrupts traffic causing delays and inconvenience,
but also damages surface-based vegetation in some areas. Additionally, underground
infrastructure density has been growing thereby making it more challenging to employ the
traditional open-cut construction method. A sustainable alternative is the use of trenchless
construction methods where underground infrastructure is installed or repaired with
minimal surface disruption.
Horizontal Directional Drilling (HDD) is one of the popular trenchless methods for
installing buried utility pipelines. Risk dimensionality and severity is generally greater in
the case of HDD projects because of the fact that only limited soil and other sub-surface
sampling will be done to choose the right type equipment, labor, materials, and drilling
plan. Some of these risks have led to accidents on HDD projects in the past that not only
damaged the equipment and other infrastructures, but also injured workers which proved
fatal in some cases. In order to minimize the safety risk in HDD projects, there is an
outstanding need for the investigation of hazards, factors and project characteristics that
propel the probability of occurrence of accidents.
This thesis report presents the development and demonstration of the hierarchical
safety risk assessment framework for investigating the safety risk, especially the
probabilities of occurrence of various hazards, of HDD projects. The developed
“Hierarchical Risk Assessment” framework is demonstrated using two real-world HDD
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projects. The safety risk analysis performed on the two case studies highlighted the factors
and project characteristics that aggravate the hazards and their probabilities of occurrence.
The proposed approach for investigating safety risk on HDD projects needs to be further
investigated and extensively evaluated on more real-world case studies before it can be
developed into an adoptable tool for practice.
Key Words: Horizontal Directional Drilling, Hierarchical Risk Assessment.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Underground pipeline infrastructure is must for supporting the increasing needs of
growing population. Trenchless methods offer significant benefits over the conventional
open-cut construction in many cases for installing buried pipelines. The conventional opencut method follows the cut-dig-bury-fill approach which is inconvenient to employ in hightraffic, dense urban areas mainly due to the surface-related disruption and the resulting
economic, environmental and societal consequences. Open-cut method can be expensive
in cases where deeper cover is specified for the pipe or where the cost of relocating
conflicting utilities and other surface structures is high. The significant amount of
excavation associated with open-cut method, especially in deeper installations, also
produce significant greenhouse gas emissions. Needless to say, they result in several
societal consequences that include but not limited to the disruption of traffic and surface
vegetation. Trenchless techniques are a class of underground construction methods that
eliminate substantial digging and its associated challenges. Trenchless techniques usually
require insignificant amount of excavation and preserves the surface-based activities.
Horizontal Directional Drilling (HDD) is a popular trenchless construction method
that is often employed to install buried utilities. Pipelines as long as 5,000 ft and sizes of
up to 36 inches have been reported to be installed using HDD (Duyvestyn, 2014). HDD
offers significant environmental and societal benefits in addition to cost benefits which
makes this method stand out of other trenchless construction methods (Ariaratnam, 2008).
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HDD technique entails three sequential steps following the pre-planning phase, namely
pilot boring, reaming and product pipe pullback.
Pre-planning phase: One of the primary tasks in the pre-planning phase of any HDD
project is conducting a thorough surface and subsurface investigation in the project location
and its surroundings to identify the constraints for a better design and construction
planning. The sub-surface exploration includes testing of rock and soil samples for
geologic characteristics and engineering properties. Details on existing subsurface utilities
and soil conditions will help plan a proper drill path and choose appropriate drilling
equipment that suits the soil conditions. Boring locations need to be subsequently planned
considering the horizontal and vertical axis of the existing utility lines. Boring depth also
needs to be determined so as to avoid conflicts with existing buried utilities and other
obstacles.
Pilot boring: A drilling equipment, called drill rig, is used in this step to drill through the
ground and create a small diameter borehole which will be enlarged using a larger diameter
reamer (step 2) and into which a product pipe will be pulled in (step 3) before final
connections are made. A set of drill rods which are connected to one another to form a drill
string is used in the pilot boring step to create the borehole. The drill string is pushed into
the ground using the drill rig which comes in different capacities in terms of thrust force
and torque. A drill head is attached to the beginning of the drill string to penetrate through
the ground by cutting the soil and displacing it. The penetration of the drill string through
the ground can be achieved either just by pushing or in some cases rotating the drill string.
The drill head has a slant face that enables steering of the drill string in the desired direction
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based on the real-time location monitoring during the drilling. The drill head is also
equipped with a monitoring device that transmits information to an above surface receiver
and the information of interest includes its horizontal and vertical location, its clock
position among other inputs. The drill head makes a slightly larger hole than the drill string
to create annular space for the movement of soil cuttings back to the ground with the help
of a pressurized drilling fluid. Bentonite mixed in water is commonly used as the drilling
fluid which helps to reduce the friction between the drill string and the borehole, cools the
cutting head, and also stabilizes the bore hole. An operator sitting on the drill rig machine
controls the drilling operation based on real-time data inputs on the location of the drill
head and also based on the desired drilling path. The “pilot boring” phase ends when the
drill string reaches the exit pit which is the other end of the desired pipeline installation.
The illustration of the pilot boring phase of HDD Operation is presented in the Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1. A picture illustrating the pilot bore phase of HDD operation (J. D. Hair &
Associates Inc., 2010)
Reaming: This stage, often called back reaming, involves enlarging the drilled pilot
borehole. A reamer, show in the Figure 1.2, is attached to the drill string at the exit point
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and the drill string is pulled back into the bore hole in order to enlarge it for the product
pipe to fit through. The size and type of the reamer used depends on the size of the product
pipe and geological conditions. Pressurized drilling fluid is continuously pumped even this
phase to push the soil cuttings out of the borehole. The reaming phase of HDD construction
method is illustrated in Figure 1.3. Reaming phase can be avoided in soft soils for the
installation of smaller diameter pipelines (Hair, 1994).

Figure 1.2. Reamer (English, 2013)

Figure 1.3. A picture illustrating the reaming phase of HDD operation (J. D. Hair &
Associates Inc., 2010).
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Pull Back: In this final phase of HDD construction, the product pipe is pulled through the
enlarged bore hole; in some cases, the pull back and reaming phases are combined. In order
to minimize the torsion on the product pipe, a swivel is used to connect the pull section to
the leading reaming assembly. The swivel prevents the product pipe from rotating even
when the drill string is rotated. The pipeline installation is completed when the product
pipe is successfully pulled back to the entry point. The illustration of the pullback phase of
HDD Operation is presented in Figure 1.4.

Figure 1.4. A picture illustrating the pullback phase of HDD operation (J. D. Hair &
Associates Inc., 2010)
Risk dimensionality and severity is generally greater in the case of HDD because
the equipment, labor and material that is used in the process are all selected to match the
predicted soil condition, ground water table, and location of other utilities, which are all
determined from limited sampling done during the pre-planning phase of the projects. Any
deviation from the predicted project parameters will escalate the risk leading to possible
accidents. Many accidents have occurred on HDD projects due to various factors that
include but not limited to uncertain soil conditions, inappropriate drilling practices,
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inaccurate locating of existing utilities, inappropriate worker apparel, and lack of effective
communication among crew members on the jobsite. Some of these accidents have resulted
in severe injuries and even deaths of workers (Marktgorman, 2010). These consequences
present a need for evaluating the safety risk on HDD projects through investigating the
current practices in the industry. Specifically, there is a need to identify and systematically
study various possible hazards and identify factors and specific project characteristics that
may aggravate the safety risk resulting from the identified hazards.

1.1

Objective of the Study:
The objective of this study is to develop and demonstrate a “Hierarchical Risk

Assessment” framework for evaluating safety risk of HDD projects. By understanding the
possible factors that aggravate the probability of occurrence of various hazards and the
specific project characteristics that support such aggravation, it is hypothesized to alleviate
the safety risk to some degree. The proposed framework and its demonstration is expected
to enable HDD practitioners to mitigate the safety risk associated with the humans,
equipment and infrastructure on the job site and carry out a productive HDD project.

1.2

Organization of the thesis:
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 presents an overview of the

problem associated in terms of safety risk in HDD projects. Chapter 2 presents a brief
review of the relevant literature. Chapter 3 describes the hierarchical risk assessment
framework. Specifically, Chapter 3 presents the identification of specific hazards, factors
responsible for the occurrence of the identified hazards, critical HDD characteristics that
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influence the safety risk. Chapter 3 also describes the survey of the influence of project
characteristics on the factors and the factors on the hazards. Chapter 4 describes the
demonstration of HRA methodology on two real world HDD projects and discusses the
findings. Chapter 5 concludes this study by summarizing the findings and their implications
and making recommendation for future follow up studies.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE
This chapter presents a brief review of relevant literature on accident causation
theories, followed by previous safety risk analysis frameworks for construction projects in
general and specifically for underground construction projects.
Domino theory of accident causation hypothesizes that identifying and finding
ways to avoid the occurrence of one key event among a series of domino events that lead
to an accident will diminish the risk of accidents and injuries (Heinrich 1931). Human
Factor Theory proposed that many accidents are caused due to human errors and these
errors were subsequently identified and categorized for risk evaluation (Ferrell 1997).
Behavior-based Safety Theory of accident causation presented a psychological aspect of
the worker behavior in the context of accidents (Gellar 2001). Another multi-level accident
progression model is proposed by Bird in which ignorance of one basic state leads to severe
injuries or accident in next levels (Bird, 1969). A few of these theories played a major role
in the development of safety risk assessment frameworks that are currently employed in
the construction industry.

2.1

Construction Safety Risk Assessment
Safety risk pertaining to general construction projects has been a research topic of

interest for several decades now and there are numerous frameworks and standards that
multiple construction companies currently follow. Some of these frameworks and
standards are briefly reviewed.
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There are many guidelines that were set internationally to enhance safety of
construction projects.
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), as part of the United
States Department of Labor, published guidelines that provide information on rule-making
process to improve the health and safety in the work place. OSHA also provides training,
outreach, education and assistance activities on their standards to the work force so that
they can be employed as required. Their standards are readily available online for anyone
to adopt. Although the regulations are numerous, almost all of them reflect the general
common sense, best practices, and includes examples on what experienced and prudent
employees would do in their jobs to maintain a risk-free work place. Limitation of those
regulations is that it does not provide quantitative assessment of risk aversion associated
with each standard.
National institute of safety and health (NIOSH), established under Occupational
health and Safety Act 1970, conducts research on workers wellbeing and spreads guidelines
through manuals on work safety and measures to maintain good health of workers. NIOSH
facilitates high-risk industrial sectors in proving innovative solutions for difficult-to-solve
problems. This source helps in critical analysis of qualitative risk characterization and helps
in management of occupational hazards.
Rand (1955) developed the Delphi method to calculate the impact of technology on
modern world. The method involves a group of experts who reply to questionnaires related
to their field of expertise and then receive feedback in the form of statistical notes of the
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"group response." Which help in quantifying uncertainty and draw a conclusion on an
opinion. Later Delphi based risk analysis was developed on the same basis to evaluate the
safety risk of construction operations where no quantitative data is available. This method
is a time consuming process and effectiveness of the work depends of the expert decision
whose perceptions may change relative to the future research on that specific topic.
Consequently, it is preferred to be used only where quantitative models are difficult to use.
Zadeh (1965) established the Fuzzy Set Theory to find a way of dealing with risk
due to hazards where the source of information related to risk is absent. The risk factors
are divided into sets. Fuzziness indicate the uncertainty in happening of a hazard which is
often expressed in linguistic terms such as high, medium, and low. These terms are further
converted into quantitative numbers by use of membership functions through which
severity is calculated by various statistical procedures. This model proves its importance
where typical mathematical models lack evidence for problem solving in complex
phenomenon, and it consumes very less time for producing the results. The limitation is
the lack of mathematical evidence for the obtained findings.
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Wang 1977) is one popular method which
helps in determining the relative importance of different attributes that causes risk by expert
evaluation in three steps: (1) work breakdown structure on risks due to specific events, (2)
compare and set priorities between structures by expert decisions, and (3) hierarchical
arrangement of priorities. Based on the expert decisions, a weightage index system is
established where the consistency between the factors causing risk is tested. This process
is mainly used in cases where there is a presence of uncertainty in the available data, or
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lack of necessary data required for risk assessment. The main advantage of AHP is its
ability to check and decrease the inconsistency of expert findings. This research employs
a methodology similar to AHP to evaluate the relative importance of factors that aggravate
the occurrence of hazards and characteristics that affect factors leading to a hazard.
Limitations of AHP method are that sometimes problems arise due to interdependence
between criteria and alternatives which can lead to inconsistencies between judgment and
ranking criteria.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) has been used for the evaluation of safety risk in
construction projects (Suresh et al., 2003). In this approach, accidents are categorized into
ground, machines, environment and management. FTA involves identifying the risk factors
encountered by construction industry by collecting information on different construction
risks and their consequences. Alternatives were developed to prevent or mitigate the risk
effects. Experts with in-depth knowledge of construction projects can provide a valuable
opinion on uncertainties. The advantage of this method is it takes less time to develop.
Construction Job Safety Analysis (CJSA) (Rozenfeld, 2006), a lean approach was
developed to manage safety in the construction industry. Safety Analysis can be performed
in three steps: (1) Identification of hazards and analysis of loss of control events that may
aggravate, (2) Evaluation of probability of occurrence of the analyzed loss of control
events, and (3) Finding the expected degree of severity caused due to possible loss-ofcontrol events with possible accident scenarios. The advantage of this method is that
relative quantitative measures for each event are obtained, but the risk reduction or the
elimination measures are not provided.
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Mitropoulos (2009) recently presented the Task Demand Methodology which
relates productivity and safety of construction projects at the same time using basic
construction operation parameters. This method is demonstrated in 4 steps: (1) Identifying
the two key factors responsible for assessing the likelihood of accidents, (2) Determination
of the exposure time on hazard, (Based on live observations and interviews), (3)
Determining the factors affecting task demand during the exposure, which basically
indicates that there will a probability of accident upon exposure to hazard, finally (4)
Calculating the safety risk of the operation i.e. exposure times the task demand. The
limitations of this method being it can only be used to compare the safety risk for same
hazard under different operational parameters but cannot be used to compare different
hazards. Other disadvantage is it does not correlate the task demand values with probability
of incidents.

2.2

Safety Risk Assessment of Underground Utility Construction Projects
Several researchers conducted studies on deriving frameworks specifically for

underground construction utility projects using general construction risk evaluation
methods, depending on the extent of available data and job site conditions. A few previous
studies are briefly reviewed in the following paragraphs.
Ariaratnam (2007) presented the Total Risk Index Model (TRI) which is used for
calculating the risk value for underground urban utility projects. This model calculates the
risk involved in the HDD and the Open Cut (OC) excavation for a specific project in two
steps using four sub-indices namely contingency plans, determining bid price, eco-social
factors, and consideration factors. Each of these indices contains a list of questions with
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choices that pertains to a specific project. Users and the industry specialists are invited to
participate in the questionnaire survey by choosing one option as their opinion. Risk Index
is calculated using the answers obtained from the survey for each sub index using Eq. 1.
RIHDD or OC = f {EI / MI}

(1)

Where RI = Risk Index; HDD = Horizontal Directional Drilling; OC = Open Cut;
EI = Estimated Index (answers obtained from users); MI = Maximum Index (answers
obtained from industry specialists);
In the next step, each sub-index is given equal weighted sub index value which is
independent of the number of questions created for each sub index. After calculating all
the sub index values, Total Risk Index (TRI) is calculated using Eq. 2.
TRIHDD or OC = f {(∑ (RI sub index)) / 4}

(2)

Where TRI = Total Risk Index; HDD = Horizontal Directional Drilling; OC =
Open Cut; RI = Risk Index (obtained from equation 1.).
TRI value is calculated both for HDD and OC methods from the values obtained
from the questionnaire. Smallest TRI value obtained method is chosen for the construction.
Advantages of this model is it takes less time, compares two methods and gives feasible
solution from four perspectives ( addressed as sub-indices in the model). Disadvantage is
that the choice of method is dependent all alone on the questionnaire results (which may
vary in the future).
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A framework using Fuzzy Comprehensive Evaluation Method (FCEM) and
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) was developed by Ma et al. (2010) for quantifying the
risk of Maxi HDD projects. The methodology entails: (1) Identifying and classifying the
risks in each level of HDD operation, (2) Finding weight value of each associated risk from
structured matrices judgement matrices, membership matrices, and index systems using
maximum membership functions and MATLAB software. The Total risk value for the
entire project is obtained by combining all the values in each level risk classifications.
Advantages are Risk management decisions can be made easily. FCEM is mainly used in
the place of complicated projects as risk values can be easily derived using subjective
judgements. Disadvantages are they provide only theoretical bases for risk evaluation but
not mathematical evidence.
Gierczak (2014) proposed a model for evaluating the safety risk of Mini, Mid, Maxi
HDD projects using Fuzzy Fault tree Analysis (FFTA). The research focuses on two main
aspects namely: (1) Development of mathematical model and, (2) Development of risk
management strategy. The first aspect is demonstrated in eight steps (1) Defining the
analysis of scope of the work, (2) Gathering information, (3) Hazard identification, (4)
Construction of Fault Tree (FT), qualitative analysis of fault tree, (6) Quantitative risk
assessment applying using of trapezoidal member ship functions fuzzy arithmetic followed
by defuzzification using center of area method (Filev 1994) (7) Managing the assessed risk,
(8) Decision making. The advantages of this method are it can be used on any type of
construction practice. It gives a broad knowledge on failure mechanisms and reduces
uncertainties. This proposed model especially carries out qualitative and quantitative risk
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assessment for the trenchless pipe installation of various sizes; but the model includes
complex calculations which take lot of time.
Choi (2015) developed a methodology named Risk Assessment Methodology for
underground construction projects. This methodology consists of three main steps to arrive
at obtaining the value of risk namely: (1) Identifying factors causing risk (2) Analyzing
those factors (3) Evaluating the risk. The tools used in this study are survey sheets (to be
filled by experts), detailed check sheets for risk identification, and a risk analysis software
based on Fuzzy concept basically coded for subway projects. This software comprises of
three modules: (1) Data input module (Data is input from the subjective judgements or
probabilistic parameter estimates, (2) Probabilistic Analysis module, (3) Output Module
(gives the risk value). The methodology is easy to use as data can be used either from
subjective judgements, observations or historic data. But the disadvantage being the
software is framed only for subway construction projects. So certain modifications are
necessary to use the project for other underground construction practices.

2.3

Overview of Safety Risk Assessment Frameworks
Table 2.1 presents advantages and limitations of various commonly-used safety risk

evaluation methods in the construction industry in general.
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Table 2.1: Commonly used safety risk evaluation methods in the construction Industry
(Cont. in Table 2.2)
Method

Advantages
Disadvantages
1. Indicates that the accident is the 1. Does not account or consider
result of a single root cause.
effective
analysis
of
environmental factors.

The Domino Theory
2. This is a Simple process, and 2. Do not provide any data on
considers only a single chain of attributes leading to the
factors ( 5 factors)
considered factors.

The Delphi Method

1. Cost effective.

1. Drop outs in response rates
of the experts may result in
inconvenience of the survey.

2. Flexible, fast and versatile process.

2. Time delays may occur in the
process in data collection
process from the experts such
as analysis and processing the
data.

3.Prevents direct communication of
experts with one another ( avoids peer
pressure and extrinsic pressure)
1. Consumes less quality time

Total Risk Index
Model

1. Experts are the only source
for the determination of TRI.

2. Compares two methods of 2. Effectiveness depends all
underground constructions and gives alone on the preparation of
feasible
solution
from
four questionnaire.
perspectives 1. A contingency plans 2.
Determining bid price 3. Eco-social
factors 4. Consideration factors.
3. Although the method is proposed
for
underground
projects,
its
simplicity makes it useful to other
general construction projects.
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Table 2.2. Commonly used safety risk evaluation methods in the construction Industry
Method

Fault Tree Analysis

Advantages
Disadvantages
1. Can be applied to analyze risk for 1. Difficulty in developing in
which there is a lack of sufficient data the member ship functions
and incomplete knowledge.
2. It involves the cause-and-effect 2. Judgement is subjective.
relationship between key factors and
the exposure for each individual risk.
3. Key risks can be identified and
managed quiet quickly.

1. This method measures safety and 1. This method focuses on
productivity of the operation at the emotionally disturbing injuries
same time.
and does not capture the risks
arising from overexertion
injuries, physical fatigue.
Task Demand
Methodology

2. This method provides researchers 2. Cannot be used to compare
and practitioners a tool for analyzing different hazards.
the accident potential under different
operational parameters and identifies
how changes in the operation affect
the accident potential scenarios under
one single hazard.
3. This will allow to design more safer 3. Does not correlate the task
and productive operations.
demand values with probability
of incidents.
4. The presence of multiple
hazards may also increase the
likelihood of incidents, as the
workers may have to divide
their attention.
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2.4

Chapter Summary
In summary, although previous studies which were discussed in this chapter

introduced many risk evaluation frameworks, only few presented easy-to-use, quick
approaches for reliable risk assessment of underground construction projects, especially
HDD projects. This thesis study proposed and demonstrated a hierarchical safety risk
assessment approach which when further evaluated and improved could serve in
diminishing the safety risk of HDD projects.
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CHAPTER 3: HIRARCHIAL RISK ASSESMENT
METHODOLOGY
Safety risk in the context of this thesis is characterized as the probability of a person
getting injured or equipment getting damaged during a Horizontal Directional Drilling
(HDD) project. A Hierarchical Risk Assessment (HRA) approach is proposed for assessing
the probability occurrence of hazards in HDD projects. Specific hazards, critical factors
that aggravate or alleviate the hazards, and various project characteristics form the
hierarchies of the HRA approach.

3.1

Hazard Identification:
Hazard in this study refers to the threat of injury or death to workers, damage to

construction equipment or any infrastructure. HDD projects are typically completed in
three sequential construction phases namely, pilot bore, reaming, and pull back. It has its
share of hazards in all the three phases that must be controlled or eliminated in order to
ensure worker and public safety (Kennedy, 2010). Several possible hazards are identified
in Figure 3.1 for each of these three phases by gathering information from various previous
HDD projects.
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Figure 3.1. Hazards

3.2

Critical HDD hazard identification:
Among the several hazards listed in Figure 3.1, four critical hazards have been

chosen upon survey of literature and reviewing various case studies on accidents occurred
on previous HDD projects. The four critical hazards are “Hitting other utilities,”
“Stall/breakage of drill string / drill head,” “Injury to workers,” and “Workers falling into
excavated pits.” These four hazards are briefly described along with accounts of accident
histories that stand as examples of these hazards being realized.
H1 - Hitting other utilities:
“Hitting other utilities” is one of the possible hazards that could occur during the
pilot bore phase of any HDD project. This hazard is realized when the drill head
accidentally hits other utilities potentially resulting in several complications that include
damages to infrastructures and resulting economic losses in addition to potential injuries

20

to workers on the jobsite depending on what type of utility line is hit. For example, hitting
a sewer line may not be as consequential as hitting a gas or electric line. This hazard may
occur due to lack of details on depth and position of existing utility lines. The probability
of occurrence of this hazard is determined to be dependent on various factors which in turn
are dependent on various project characteristics.
The factors that influence the hazard “Hitting other utilities” are identified through
survey of literature and synthesis of past accidents on HDD projects. The three major
factors which are determined to influence “Hit other utilities” hazard in HDD projects are:
F1 - Experience of the worker on job site:
In any boring operation, the project success is mainly dependent on the operator
who is controlling the boring/drilling equipment. In such a case, the skill level the operator
possesses would play an important role in successfully completing the drilling operation.
In the presence of one or more utility lines, there is a good possibility for the contractor on
lacking details on the vertical elevation in some cases, though the location of existing
utilities is known through sub-surface utility investigation. During such conditions the
contractor has to deal carefully to plan the drill above or below the utility line. This is more
likely possible through experience in handling such situations. Lack of spontaneity, another
experiential attribute, on such situations may result in hitting other utilities.
F2 - Accuracy of sub-surface utility Engineering (SUE):
It is very important to have accurate SUE data which can be achieved, for example
by following the guidelines presented in “ASCE 38-02” manual. From the accident case
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studies, literature review and in person observation of the boring operation, it is understood
that “Hitting other utilities” may occur due to the lack of accurate SUE data and therefore
this factor is identified as one of the critical factors for this hazard.
F3 - Inappropriate/Lack of a communication mechanism among the crew:
Inappropriate communication or lack of a communication mechanism enabled
through Walkie-talkies, Radios, or Walk-over systems influence the safety risk of a HDD
operation. Any deviations in the drill path as noted by the walkover system or any other
issues arising on the jobsite need to be notified to the drill rig operator in a timely manner
for the safety of people, equipment and infrastructure.
The following real-world examples describe the circumstances and the
consequences of accidents where other utility lines were hit during a HDD project due to
lack of communication among the crew and thorough details on exiting utilities, and so
these factors were identified as critical factors for the Hazard “ Hitting other utilities.”
i.

The gas explosion occurred in St. Paul, Minneapolis at Arden Avenue in Edina,
which was due to a gas leak that eventually sparked the explosion when cable crews
using directional drilling equipment ruptured a gas line. The consequences of this
accident include the demolition of two houses near 5000 Arden Ave. in Edina
(Nelson, 2010).

ii.

In 1997, Datong No. 1 Coal Mine and Shihao Coal Mine in china used two units of
LHD-75 Directional Drill System for gas drainage. The experiment was dropped
because of the collapse of the borehole due to imported equipment that were
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damaged during transportation and also the geology problems which were not
detected in the sub surface investigation. The results are leaving sticking problems
up to the bore depth of 45 m and 75 m in Datong No. 1 Coal Mine and Shihao Coal
Mine, respectively. (Lu, 2011)
H2 - Stall/breakage of drill string/drill head:
This is considered one of the critical hazards that could possibly occur in any HDD
project if safe design and drilling procedures are not given priority. Stall/breakage of the
drilling tools might occur due to lack of proper geotechnical data or usage of aged tools
which are no longer able to support the designed operation. There is a good possibility of
this hazard occurring due to excess use of torque and drag by the operator than necessary.
This hazard results in the breakage of the drill string thereby halting the drilling operation
before the drilling tools are restored and operation reinitiated. Sometimes, the stalling of
drill string may even topple the drill rig and injure the operator.
Three critical factors were identified to be influencing the probability of occurrence
of this hazard. They are:
F1 - Experience of the worker on job site:
Any drilling operation is influenced by the person operating the primary equipment
which is the HDD drill rig in this case. Maintenance of thrust and torque loads within the
safe limits of the particular drill rig by keeping in mind the uncertainties with respect to the
geological conditions of the ground is a responsibility of the drill rig operator that is
expected to be more efficiently carried out by experienced operators. Inappropriate loads
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on the drill rig in a given soil condition may lead to “Stall/breakage of drill string/drill
head” and may even lead to the collapse of the drill rig (Boomana, et al., 2013).
F4 - Age of the tool used for the HDD operation:
Aged tools such as the drill string, drill head that are used in any HDD operation
may no longer be able to handle the design loading when operating in tough sub-surface
geology. In such cases, “Stall/ breakage of drill string/ drill head” is possible.
F5 - Exceeding the force limits of the drill rig:
Pipe movements such as drilling ahead or tripping create drag, while rotation
produces torque (Ruiz, 2014); the normal contact force between pipe and the borehole wall
is influenced by these force limits. Exceeding the limits of these forces may break the
equipment and subsequently result in the stalling of the drill string. The consequence
resulting in this factor occurrence were undesirable as observed in the past HDD projects,
and so it is considered as one of the factors responsible for the hazard “Stall/breakage of
drill string/drill head.” The force limits and the rotational capacity are equally important as
other factors, for they may equally influence the safety risk. Lack of frequent monitoring
of the values may lead to “Stall/breakage of drill string/drill head.” There are few scenarios
where this hazard has been realized (Ugrich, 2007)
H3 - Injury to worker:
This is identified as one of the critical hazards in HDD projects as evidenced by its
occurrences on past projects (Canada News, 2009). This hazard is mainly caused due to
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machinery attacks or unforeseen conditions in addition to the workers being careless – e.g.,
moving in close proximity to working equipment, inattentive to the commination systems
among the crew or due to the machinery attacks on the crew like the drill string hitting the
workers while it exits the borehole. Even collapse of equipment due to unforeseen
conditions may also happen due to natural hazards or human mistakes which lead to death
or major injury to workers.
Three critical factors were determined to be influencing the probability of
occurrence of this hazard and are briefly described in the following paragraphs:
F1 - Experience of the worker on job site:
Construction workers constantly need to adapt to the changing work environments,
and their attentiveness and general cognizance of the work environment influences their
ability to be safe on the jobsite (Canadian Centre for Occupational Health & Safety, 2016).
Although workers are trained to safely execute their specific tasks, their general response
and attention to activities on the jobsite – a trait expected to grow on with experience –
influence the safety risk.
F6 - Lack of PPE:
Personal protective equipment (PPE) is of utmost importance in any construction
activity no matter what the activity is. Many incidents in the past proved how useful PPE
is for mitigating accidents when hazard-related uncertainties arise. Consequently, “Lack of
PPE” is identified as a critical factor that affects the ability of a worker to be protected from
potential injuries.
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F7 - Unsuitable apparel for the work conditions:
Material, color and type of the apparel used for a HDD operation influence the
safety risk of the operation. This has been found to be a crucial factor based on a few past
accidents on HDD job sites.
The following is an example of a past project where this hazard occurred:
i.

A worker got injured in Alberta, Canada on September 19th 2009, during a HDD
operation. The worker got injured as a result of equipment failure in the middle of
a culvert-drilling project under a highway. The injury turned out to be fatal leading
to the death of the worker. The officials said that HDD operation is unusual practice
for that kind of a project. (Canada News, 2009).

H4 - Workers falling into excavated Pits:
This could happen on a HDD job site due to the carelessness of workers in addition
to several other factors such as lack of safe working conditions. The previous hazard related
to worker injuries is only due to machinery and not workers carelessness. The consequence
of the current hazard is that the workers could fall into entry or exit pits, or creeks and other
large water bodies across which a pipeline is being installed using HDD due to inattentive
behavior of the worker in reacting to the job site conditions.
Four critical factors were determined to be influencing the probability of occurrence
of H4 hazard. The factors are briefly described in the following paragraphs:
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F1 - Experience of the worker on job site:
Like any other hazard, the safety risk of “Workers falling into excavated pits” is
also expected to be strongly influenced by the “Experience of the worker on job site”.
F3 - Inappropriate/Lack of communication mechanism among the crew:
Inappropriate real-time communication and lack of adequate training may also lead
to Workers falling into excavated pits, and it is therefore identified as a critical factor.
F8 - Lack of proper barricading around the pits and alarms:
Safety on the job site is maintained by following a few minimum safety regulations.
It is identified from the review of a few past projects that lack of proper barricading around
the excavated pits and alarms influence the safety risk of a HDD operation.
F9 - Behavior and postures of the workers during the drilling operation:
The posture of workers on HDD projects, especially when they are pushed to be
more productive, could become unsafe and may lead to them falling into pits or trenches.
OSHA and the United States Department of Labor have set some guidelines to avoid
accidents in such job site conditions.
The following is an example of a past HDD project where this hazard occurred:
i. During the mid-spring of 2008, a crew was using a Horizontal Directional Drilling
(HDD) machine to install a water line along a rural Iowa roadway. After completion
of the pilot bore phase, the worker who was 600ft away from the drill rig operator
removed the drill bit from the exit pit to attach a back reamer to the end of the drill
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rod. Before the worker set his position away from the rig, the drill rig operator
started back-reaming operation. When the drill rig operator was asking the worker
at the exit side for the reamers progress, he apparently discovered the victim’s body
wrapped around the drill line in the area of the pre-cutter just ahead of the back
reamer (University of IOWA, 2008).

3.3

HDD Project Characteristics that influence safety risk
While the hazards and factors identified hitherto are generic in nature, they are

influenced by the specific characteristics of any HDD project. Characteristics are tied to
the factors in the hierarchical risk assessment methodology. Several characteristics for each
factor are identified in the following:
F1 - Experience of the drilling contractor.
C1 - Less than 3 years
C2 - 3 to 7 years
C3 - 7 to 10 years
C4 - More than 15 years
F2 - Accuracy of Sub surface Utility Engineering (SUE).
C1 – Quality Level D (per ASCE 38-02): Information collected from existing records or
oral recollection of existing utility holders
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C2 – Quality Level C (per ASCE 38-02): Information gathered from surveying and by
plotting utility features existing above ground/Use of professional judgement in correlating
this information to quality level D
C3 – Quality level B (per ASCE 38-02): Information obtained by application of surface
geophysical methods to determine the existence and approximate positioning of utilities in
horizontal direction
C4 – Quality level A (per ASCE 38-02): Information regarding the horizontal and vertical
location of utilities through actual exposure and measurement of subsurface utilities
generally at a specific point
F3 - Inappropriate/Lack of communication mechanism among the crew.
C1 – Low Quality walk over system due to which obstacles where physical walk over is
difficult
C2 – High Quality of the walk over system operated by skilled labor
C3 – Interference with the magnetic fields from the underground buried power lines due
to quality of walk over system
C4 – A non-skilled locator operating a high quality walk over system/Improper Basics of
reading and interpreting the signals.
F4 - Age of the tool used for the HDD operation.
C1 - More than 10 years
C2 - 7 to 10 years
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C3 - 3 to 7 years
C4 - Less than 3 years
F5 - Exceeding the force limits of the drill rig.
C1 - Inexperienced operator performing the boring operation in maintaining the limits of
buffer capacity of the drill rig
C2 - Experienced operator performing the boring operation in maintaining the limits of
buffer capacity of the drill rig
C3 - Machinery problem.
F6 - Lack of PPE.
C1 - Lack of certain PPE availability on site to replace the damaged ones.
C2 - Unsuitability of the available PPE for that particular operation.
F7 - Unsuitable apparel for the work conditions.
C1 - Improper clothing of the worker whether it is material or type (wet/dry)
C2 - Attention to each other among the crew on the job site due to lack of high visibility
clothing
F8 - Lack of proper barricading around the excavated pits and alarms.
C1 - Lack of Backfill/Adequate barrier around temporary wells, pits, shafts, etc.
C2 -Warning lines with high visibility material and low intensity sound of the alarm
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F9 - Behavior and posture of the worker in the job conditions.
C1 - Mental Stability of the worker.
C2 - Physical Stability of the worker
C3 - Level of training of the worker received and experience of the worker.

3.4

Description of the Hierarchical Risk Assessment Methodology
In this pursuit, attributes influencing each hazard are known from a limited number

of case studies, but there is dearth of quantitative data to develop relationship functions
between the hazards and the influential factors.
A tree diagram presented in the Figure 3.2 represents the hierarchy of the hazards,
influential factors and the project characteristics considered for the generation of
“Hierarchical Risk Assessment” framework.
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Figure 3.2. Hierarchical representation of the hazards, influential factors and the project characteristics.
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A very minimum historic data is available on the factors and hazards used for this
framework. In order to address this limitation a pair wise comparative questionnaire survey
is prepared with five qualitative answer choices for each question. An example question in
this survey is:
Q) Relative to the factor “wrongly marked utilities,” how significantly will the factor
“experience of the operator performing the boring operation” contribute to the occurrence
of “hit other utility” hazard?
(a) Very high
(b) Somewhat high
(c) Equal
(d) Somewhat Low
(e) Very Low
The complete questionnaire survey for understanding the influence of factors on
the hazards is included in Appendix A. A similar questionnaire was used for the
determining the relative influence of characteristics on the factors.
Experts having similar level of experience with HDD projects are invited to answer
the questionnaire by choosing one option as their choice for each question. Their responses
are later converted into quantitative numbers by use of the rating chart shown in Table 3.1.
Based on the experts’ responses and their subsequent conversion to quantitative
ratings as per Table 3.1, relative influential measures (in percentages) of various factors on
the hazards and similarly various characteristics on each factor (refer to the hierarchy in
Figure 3.2) are estimated. The relative influential measures are estimated based on pairwise
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comparison judgments and the resulting priority vector (Rangone, 1996; Saaty, 2003).
Such pair-wise judgments are helpful where no quantitative data is available, which is the
case in the risk assessment framework proposed in this study.
Table 3.1. Rating Chart for Quantifying Questionnaire Responses
Qualitative Terms

Ratings

Very high

3

Somewhat high

2

Equal

1

Somewhat Low

1/2

Very Low

1/3

For a given HDD Project, considering the job site details, crew details, durations,
safety details, equipment details, the probability of occurrence of the hazard are estimated
from the relative influence of factors on respective hazards and relative influence of
characteristics on respective factors. The percentage influence values, i.e. the priority
vector (Saaty, 2003), are derived from the questionnaire responses, as illustrated in Tables
3.2 and 3.3 for the influence of F1, F2 and F3 on H1. Table 3.4 presents the priority vector
values which reflect the estimated relative influence of F1, F2 and F3 on H1.

34

Table 3.2. Expert responses (quantitative) for the influence of factors F1, F2 and F3 on H1
hazard
Hazard – 1 (H1)
F12

F23

F13

E1

1

0.5

3

E2

0.5

0.3

3

E3

1

3

0.3

E4

0.5

3

3

E5

0.3

2

2

Avg. (E1:E5)

0.66

1.76

2.26

In Table 3.2,
E = Expert
F12 = Influence of F1 on H1 compared to F2; F21 = 1/F12
F23 = Influence of F2 on H1 compared to F3; F32 = 1/F23
F13 = Influence of F1 on H1 compared to F3; F31 = 1/F13
Avg. (E1:E5) = Average of all the responses
Table 3.3. Priority vector calculation (part 1)
Factors

F1

F2

F3

F1

1

0.66

2.26

F2

1.51

1

1.76

F3

0.44

0.56

1

Sum

2.95

2.26

5.02

The priority vector is calculated by taking average of each row in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4. Priority vector calculation (part 2)
Factors

F1

F2

F3

F1

1/2.95

F2

1.51/2.95

F3

0.44/2.95 0.56/2.26

0.66/2.26 2.26/5.02
1/2.26

Priority Vector
0.3616

1.76/5.02

0.4375

1/5.02

0.2007

Similarly, Priority Vectors are calculated to represent the influence of respective
factors on other hazards, and the influence of project characteristics on the factors.
Summarized survey responses that are used in performing the calculations of Priority
Vectors are included in Appendix B. The hierarchical illustration presented in Figure 3.3
shows the estimated influence of various characteristics on the factors and similarly the
influence of factors on the hazards.
The probability of occurrence (PO) of a hazard can be calculated using Eq. 3.
PO of any Hazard, 𝐻𝑖 = ∑𝑎𝑖 (𝐹𝑎𝑖 × 𝐶𝐹𝑎 )
Where H = Hazard;
i = Index of a given hazard;
a = Index of the specific factor that influences hazard i;
𝐹𝑎𝑖 = Priority vector value of the respective factor Fa that influences hazard i;
𝐶𝐹𝑎 = Priority vector value of the characteristic chosen for a given factor Fa;
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(3)

Figure 3.3. Hierarchical representation of the hazards, relative influential factors and the project characteristics.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This Chapter presents the description of two mini HDD projects and the findings
from the demonstration of the HRA framework on them.

4.1

Case Study 1: Anderson, SC.
This construction project entails installing a 2” high density polyethylene (HDPE)

water service line using horizontal directional drilling (HDD) method. The water service
line connects the water main to a residential dwelling in Anderson, SC through a recently
installed water meter. The dwelling is located at a significant higher elevation compared to
the water meter and the average depth of installation is about 6ft. This case study analyzes
only the pilot hole drilling part of this HDD project. All the data was recorded in person
on the day of drilling which was 10th February of 2016.
Construction Operational Planning
The contractor chose to use a Mini HDD drill rig for this project to install the 2”
HDPE pipeline through lean clay of low plasticity (i.e., CL type as per USCS
classification). The contractor employed a two-person crew for this job with one operating
the drill rig (hereafter referred as crew member A) and other locating the drill head and
monitoring the drill path (hereafter referred as crew member B). It should be noted that the
weather was not very supportive on the day of drilling with a recorded temperature of -40
C (or ≈ 250 F). The construction equipment and materials on the project site includes a D
9x13 S3 Navigator Horizontal Directional Drill Rig, a fluid tank, drilling fluid, a manuallyoperated walk over system, 2” HDPE pipe spool, and a truck carrying various spare parts.
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The drill rig used in this project, which is shown in Figure 4.1, has rated capacities of
13,000 ft-lb rotational torque and 9,000 lbs. of thrust and pull back forces. The fluid mixing
tank, which is shown in Figure 4.2, has a capacity of 500 gallons. The 2” HDPE pipe spool,
which is depicted in Figure 4.3, is of Schedule 40 type. The site layout is depicted in Figure
4.4.

Figure 4.1. D 9x13 S3 Navigator Horizontal Directional Drill
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Figure 4.2. A 500-gallon fluid mixing tank
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Figure 4.3. 2" HDPE Pipe Spool

41

Figure 4.4. Project Site Layout.
Construction Challenges
The reason for including this case study in this thesis despite the fact that it covers
only the pilot-hole drilling phase of the project is because of the unique challenges it
presented in terms of existing subsurface utilities and jobsite landscape. There were four
existing utility lines in the direction of the drill path which were marked by the respective
utility departments prior to drilling; these include a gas line (marked in yellow, as shown
in Figure 4.5), a drinking water line (marked in blue, as shown in Figure 4.5), a
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communications line (marked in orange, as shown in Figure 4.5), and a power line (marked
in red, as shown in Figure 4.6).

Figure 4.5. Water, gas and communications utility markings on the project sire (White
arrow indicates the drilling direction)
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Figure 4.6. Electric utility marking on the project site
While the gas, communications and water lines did not prove to be conflicting with
the proposed drill path, the power line which also crosses the creek from beneath posed a
major conflict that resulted in re-initiating the drilling activity six times before it went
smoothly. The challenge was to set the angle of entry for the pilot bore in such a way that
the drill string maintains a safe distance from the power line (above or below) and at the
same time stays at a safe depth beneath the creek and not hit the creek wall which is made
up of rocks. As can be observed from the illustration presented in Figure 4.7, the drill path
either had to be over the power line and under the rocks or much deeper than the power
line and the rocks. Drilling at greater depths is not an option as the drilling radius is
constrained by the equipment, and the dwelling to which a water line connection is being
made is at a much higher elevation beyond the creek.
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Figure 4.7. Illustration of the construction challenge associated with drilling under the
creek wall and above the power line
Another factor that exacerbated this challenge is the fact the there is no data
available on the depth of the power line. Due to lack of data on the depth of the power line,
the project crew had to employ a reasonably risky approach of trial and error with the
objective of going over the power line and underneath the creek wall. To minimize the risk
of hitting the power line, the crew had to constantly stop and evaluate the possibility of
closer proximity to the power line by attempting to even expose the power line at times, as
shown in Figure 4.8.
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Figure 4.8. Crew members trying to expose the power line while the drilling is
suspended
Due to the perceived risk, the crew decided to change the position and orientation
(i.e., angle of entry) of the drill rig six times before they were able to overcome the hurdle
of safely crossing the power line and the creek. In a few earlier attempts, the operator drilled
through the soil up until the location of the power line and then the drilling had to be
abandoned for the fear of close proximity in depth to the power line. In other earlier
attempts, the operator drilled through the soil much deeper than the expected depth of the
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power line but couldn’t get the drill string to a desired depth underneath the creek. The
position and/or orientation of the drill rig had changed in each of the six attempts.
During the multiple failed attempts to safely navigate the subsurface and other
constraints, some unsafe behavior, especially of crew member B, was observed. In an
attempt to be efficient, the crew member B had leaned on to a tree dangerously closer to
the creek, as shown in Figure 4.9, to estimate the depth of the drill head as it entered the
creek.
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Figure 4.9. A picture showing the crew member B hanging on to a tree closer to the
creek
Although there were no accidents on this job, crew member B could have slipped
or lost support from the tree branch he was hanging on to and may have fallen into the
creek. This observation clearly relates to the Hazard 4 – Workers falling into pits as a result
of their behaviors and postures –discussed in Chapter 3 as part of the Hierarchal Risk
Assessment methodology. In such situations, the crew member could have used a more
stable support or used some kind of protective equipment. The operational planning could
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have also been better with safety risks such as this eliminated with better work organization
and planning.
Contamination of creek water from the intrusion of drilling fluid was also observed
in some of the failed attempts to drill underneath the creek. The drill head had pierced
through the rocks at the surface level and as a result the drilling fluid mixed with the
excavated soil is released into the creek water, as can be observed from Figure 4.10. The
inadvertent release of drilling fluid into a water body is a major environmental concern
(Ariaratnam et al., 2007) due to the effects of the drilling fluid additives and soil on the
aquatic life in these water bodies. The operating crew could have easily avoided this by
adopting the best practices for drilling under water bodies (Bennett and Ariaratnam, 2008).
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Figure 4.10. Inadvertent drilling fluid returns to the creek
Data Collection
The data necessary for performing the safety risk analysis of this HDD job was
collected through personal observation and also through a brief interview of the drill rig
operator who seemed to be the superintendent on the jobsite. The collected data is presented
in Tables 4.1 to 4.5.
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Table 4.1. Job Site Details
Parameters
Location of the Job site
Date
Season and weather conditions
Work timings
Length of the Bore hole
Depth of Installation
Soil conditions
Obstacles along the bore hole
Utility lines located in the surroundings
Level of accuracy of SUE
Number of excavated pits
Traffic around the work site

Data Input
Anderson, SC
2/10/2016
Spring, -40 C (or ≈ 250 F).
10:00 AM 200 ft.
6 ft. (average)
Low plasticity, Lean clay (CL)
One water body
Gas, communications, power and water
lines
Level 2
2 ( Entry pit, Exit pit)
No traffic

Table 4.2. Crew Details
Parameters
Number of workers at Entry pit
Number of workers at Exit pit
Position of the crew

Data Input
1
1
Person A at the drill rig, person B
monitoring the drill head
Table 4.3. Durations

Parameters
Pilot bore phase
Reaming phase
Pull back phase

Data Input
10:00 To …….
N/A
N/A
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Table 4.4. Equipment Details
Parameters
Type and Diameter of the pipe
Amount of fluid used for operation
Drill fluid return timings
Torque
Pull back
Type of Communication System
Angle of the drill rig at the entrance
Age of the tools used in the operation

Data Input
2” HDPE Pipe
500 Gallons
No returns
13,000 ft-lb.
9,000 lbs.
Walk over system
200
3 Years

Table 4.5. Safety Details
Parameters
PPE of the Labor
Type of barricading around the job site
Unsafe behavior and posters of the
workers
Safety Regulations followed by the crew
Color of clothing
Material of the Clothing
Number of warning lines around the job
site

Data Input
Leather clothing, Shoes, Hat
N/A
One ( Hanging to the branches of the tree
)
None
N/A
Leather as it is cold
1

Analysis:
Based on the data collected for the pilot-hole phase of this mini HDD project, safety
risk is estimated using the Hierarchical Safety Risk Assessment approach described in
Chapter 3. Characteristics are chosen for each factor based on the data from Tables 4.1
through 4.5 and presented in Table 4.6. The relative percentage preferences of the
characteristics in terms of their safety attributes, which are derived from a survey of HDD
contractors, are also presented in Table 6.
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Table 4.6. Characteristics and Corresponding Percentage Scores for each Factor
Factor
F1 - Experience of the
operator performing the
boring operation
F2 - Accuracy of SUE

Characteristic
C4 - More than 10 years

Weightage
16.36%

C4 - Quality level B (per ASCE 38-02):
Information obtained by application of
surface geophysical methods to determine
the existence and approximate positioning
of utilities in horizontal direction.

25.96%

F3 - Failure in
Communication mechanism

C2 - Good quality walk over system
operated by the skilled labor

21.52%

F4 - Age of the tools used
for the operation

C2 – 3 to 7 years

24.05%

F5 - Increased Torque/drag/ C1 - Experience of the operator
Rotational Speed of the drill performing the boring operation in
rig
maintaining the limits of buffer capacity
of the drill rig
F6 - Lack of PPE
C1 – Unsuitable material / Color of the
clothing

25.54%

F7 - Unsuitable apparel for
the work conditions

C2 - Attention towards the worker on the
job site due to lack of High visibility
Clothing
C1 - Lack of Backfill / Adequate barrier
around temporary wells, pits, shafts, etc.

47.61%

C3 - Physical Stability of the worker

37.44%

F8 - Lack of Proper
barricading around the
excavated pits
F9 – Behavior and Posture
of the workers

43.30%

50.78%

The probability of occurrence of various hazards is calculated based on the
characteristic scores along with the relative weightings of factors for each hazard. Figure
4.11 shows a hierarchical tree diagram with percentages values for each factor under each
hazard and for each characteristic under each factor. The probability of occurrence of a
hazard in case of an accident can be calculated using Eq. 3.
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Figure 4.11. The probabilities of occurrence of various hazards derived from the data of case study #1
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It can be observed from the results that the probabilities of occurrence of the four
hazards are not high, which is a comforting fact. Hazards 3 and 4 have relatively high
values of estimated probabilities of occurrences of 0.33 and 0.29 respectively, followed by
Hazard 1 with 0.21 and finally Hazard 2 with 0.18. The following can be inferred from the
findings of the HRA approach employed on the mini HDD project in case study #1:
1. The probability of occurrence of Hazard 1, Hit other utilities, is low mainly due to:
(a) significant experience of the drill rig operator that made him cautious of this
hazard, as evidenced by the adjustments made in this case study, and (b) the use of
appropriate communication systems that reliably relay data on the drill head
position. These considerations were very much in line with the expected safety
standards. The significant issue in this case study, however, is the lack of adequate
sub-surface utility engineering data, especially the depth of the conflicting power
utility. If the power utility depth was known, the contractor would not have faced
the issues that he did in drilling above the power line.
2. The probability of occurrence of Hazard 2 is also found to be very low, mainly due
to the facts that the used HDD equipment is not very old, the operator is experienced
and was careful enough to be within the limits of the thrust and torque loads.
Furthermore, HDD is expected to do well with clayey soils that existed in this case
study, thereby not making this it a challenging soil cutting job.
3. The probability of occurrence of Hazard 3, Injury to workers is found to be high
although the workers are well experienced in HDD projects. This is mainly due to
lack of appropriate apparel such as high visibility clothing and also lack of PPE
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such as head protection, both of which are most influential factors as described in
the chapter 3 for the hazard, Injury to workers.
4. The probability of occurrence Hazard 4, Workers falling into excavated pits is
found to be slightly lower than that of Hazard 3. Hazard 4 was aggravated by: (a)
Lack of barricaders around the creek, (b) unsafe posture of the worker noticed when
he is tried to reach over and the creek to monitor the drill head position. However,
knowing the depth of power line burial would have prevented the unsafe behavior
of crew member B in this case study.

4.2

Case Study 2: AnMed Health Women's & Children's Hospital,

Anderson, SC.
This construction project entails installing a 1” high density polyethylene (HDPE)
electric service line using horizontal directional drilling (HDD) method. The electric
service line connects the grid to a lake down the AnMed Health Women's & Children's
Hospital, Anderson, SC. The average depth of installation is about 10ft. This case study
analyzes pilot bore and Pull back phase of the HDD project. All the data was recorded in
person on the day of drilling which was 5th May, 2016.
Construction Operational Planning
The contractor chose to use Mini HDD drill rig for this project to install the 1”
HDPE pipeline through lean clay of low plasticity (i.e., CL type as per USCS
classification). The contractor employed a two-person crew for this job with one operating
the drill rig (hereafter referred as crew member A) and other locating the drill head and
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monitoring the drill path (hereafter referred as crew member B). The weather was
supportive on the day of drilling with a recorded temperature of 180 C (or ≈ 64.40 F). The
construction equipment and materials on the project site includes a D 9x13 S3 Navigator
Horizontal Directional Drill Rig, a fluid tank, drilling fluid, a manually-operated walk over
system, 1” HDPE pipe spool, and a truck carrying various spare parts. Several of these tools
are similar to those used in the first case study. The drill rig used in this project has rated
capacities of 13,000 ft-lb rotational torque and 9,000 lbs. of thrust and pull back forces.
The fluid mixing tank, which is shown in Figure 4.12, has a capacity of 500 gallons. The
1” HDPE pipe spool is depicted in Figure 4.13 and the truck carrying various accessories
and tools is shown in Figure 4.14. The site layout is depicted in Figure 4.15.

Figure 4.12. A 500-gallon fluid mixing tank
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Figure 4.13. 1" HDPE pipe spool

58

Figure 4.14. Truck with spare parts
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Figure 4.15. Project Site Layout
Construction Challenges
There were no unique construction challenges faced on the day of drilling as a brief
job site survey was conducted prior to start of drilling process and depth of the existing
utility lines were clearly marked by the respective utility departments, as shown in the
Figure 4.16. This case study covers pilot-hole drilling phase and pull back phase of the
project. There were three existing utility lines in the direction of the drill path which were
marked by the respective utility departments prior to drilling; these include a power line
(marked in Red, as shown in Figure 4.16), a drinking water line (marked in blue, as shown
in Figure 4.16), and a communications line (marked in orange, as shown in Figure 4.17).
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Figure 4.16. Water and Power utility markings on the project site

Figure 4.17. Power and communication utility markings on the project site
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The drilling operation went smoothly in both pilot bore and reaming phases without
any disturbances. There were also no obstacles and disturbance along the drill path, and
the risk of “hitting other utilities” was negligible, as there were no existing utilities in the
planned drill path.
The position and the orientation of the drill rig were appropriate and didn’t need to
be changed throughout the drilling process which helped the operation go smoothly. The
safety on the job site is maintained well enough as per the traffic conditions by arranging
safety cones as shown in the Figure 4.18.

Figure 4.18. Safety cones arranged to shut the traffic for duration of the work

Though the site was inspected by the contractor before the day of drilling, some
unsafe behavior in terms of working posture of the crew member B was observed at the
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exit pit as shown in the Figure 4.19. After the successful completion of the operation, the
crew member B was working with a compact excavator in between the bushes to fill the
excavated exit pit to even the ground surface. It seemed to be an unsafe act by crew B as
the area where the compact excavator is placed is not clear enough to perform such work.

Figure 4.19. A picture showing the crew member B filling the excavated pit
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Figure 4.20. A picture showing the crew member B filling the excavated exit pit

The picture shown in the Figure 4.20 relates to the Hazard 3 – Injury to workers (as
a result of lack of PPE) - which was discussed in Chapter 3 as part of the Hierarchal Risk
Assessment methodology. In such situations, the crew member could have either used an
appropriate helmet or simply could have done the job from other safe direction. The
operational planning could have also been better with safety risks such as this eliminated
with better work organization and planning.
Data Collection
The data necessary for performing the safety risk analysis of this HDD job was
collected through personal observation and also through a brief interview of the drill rig
operator who seemed to be superintendent on the jobsite. The collected data is presented
in Tables 4.7 to 4.11.
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Table 4.7. Job Site Details
Parameters
Location of the Job site
Date
Season and weather conditions
Work timings
Length of the Bore hole
Depth of Installation
Soil conditions
Obstacles along the bore hole
Utility lines located in the
surroundings
Level of accuracy of SUE
Number of excavated pits
Traffic around the work site

Data Input
Anderson, SC
5/5/2016
Spring, 180 C (or ≈ 640 F).
9:45 AM – 11:00 AM
455 ft.
10 ft. (average)
Low plasticity, Lean clay (CL)
Communications, power and water lines
Level 2
2 ( Entry pit, Exit pit)
No traffic
Table 4.8. Crew Details

Parameters
Number of workers at Entry pit
Number of workers at Exit pit
Position of the crew

Data Input
1
1
Person A at the drill rig, person B monitoring
the drill head
Table 4.9. Durations

Parameters
Pilot bore phase
Reaming phase
Pull back phase

Data Input
09:45 AM to 10:15 AM
N/A
10:25 AM to 11:00 AM
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Table 4.10. Equipment Details
Parameters
Type and Diameter of the pipe
Amount of fluid used for operation
Drill fluid return timings
Torque
Pull back
Type of Communication System
Angle of the drill rig at the entrance
Age of the tools used in the operation

Data Input
1” HDPE Pipe
500 Gallons
No returns
13,000 ft-lb.
9,000 lbs.
Radio
300
1 Year

Table 4.11. Safety Details
Parameters
PPE of the Labor
Type of barricading around the job site
Unsafe behavior and posters of the
workers
Safety Regulations followed by the crew
Color of clothing
Material of the Clothing
Number of warning lines around the job
site

Data Input
Leather clothing, Safety vest, Shoes, Hat
Safety Cones
One ( working under the trees to clear the
ground surface )
OSHA
N/A
Leather Jackets
1

Analysis
Based on the data collected for the pilot-hole and Pull-back phases of this mini
HDD project, probabilities of occurrence of various hazards are estimated using the
Hierarchical Safety Risk Assessment (HRA) approach that was described in Chapter 3.
Characteristics are chosen for each factor based on the data from Tables 4.7 through 4.11
and presented in Table 4.12. The relative percentage preferences of the characteristics in
terms of their safety attributes, which are derived from a survey of HDD contractors, are
also presented in Table 4.12.
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Table 4.12. Characteristics and Corresponding Percentage Scores for each Factor
Factor
F1 - Experience of the
operator performing the
boring operation
F2 - Accuracy of SUE

Characteristic
C4 - More than 10 Years

C3 - Quality level B (per ASCE 38-02):
Information obtained by application of
surface
geophysical
methods
to
determine the existence and approximate
positioning of utilities in horizontal
direction

21.52%

F3 - Failure in
Communication mechanism

C2 - Good quality walk over system
operated by the skilled labor

21.52%

F4 - Age of the tools used for
the operation

C1 – Less than 3 years

13.70%

F5 - Increased Torque/drag/
Rotational Speed of the drill
rig

C1 - Experience of the operator
performing the boring operation in
maintaining the limits of buffer capacity
of the drill rig
C1 – Unsuitable material / Color of the
clothing

25.54%

F7 - Unsuitable apparel for
the work conditions

C1 – Improper clothing/PPE of the
worker

52.38%

F8 - Lack of Proper
barricading around the
excavated pits
F9 – Behavior and Posture of
the workers

C3 – Level of Training received by the
worker

37.44%

F6 - Lack of PPE

Weightage
16.36%

43.30%

The probability of occurrence of various hazards is estimated based on the
characteristic scores along with the relative weightings of factors for each hazard. Figure
4.21 shows a hierarchy tree diagram with percentages values for each factor under each
hazard and for each characteristic under each factor. Probability of occurrence any hazard
can be calculated using Eq. 3.
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Figure 4.21. The probabilities of occurrence of various hazards derived from the data of case study #2
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As can be observed from Figure 4.21, the probabilities of occurrence of various hazards
are not significantly high with the maximum value being 0.33. Some inferences based on
these findings:
1. The probability of occurrence of Hazard 1, Hit other utilities, is 0.20 in this case
study. This low value is mainly due to: (a) Accuracy of the SUE marking, (b) the
use of appropriate communication systems that reliably relay data on the drill head
position. These considerations were very much in line with the expected safety
standards. There were no significant construction challenges as the drill path was
carefully planned before the start of actual drilling.
2. The probability of occurrence of Hazard 2, Stall/ Breakage of the drill string/drill
head is significantly low with a value of 0.18. The reason behind this is: (a) use of
drill tools with good age criteria, (b) significant experience of the drill rig operator
that made the operation go successfully in estimated time. However, proper
planning of the drilling activity in each phase has also helped the crew to perform
the job without facing surprising challenges.
3. The probability of occurrence of Hazard 3, Injury to workers is relatively high at
0.33 and it is mainly aggravated by: (a) the unsafe behavior exhibited by the worker
B at the end of the operation while leveling the ground surface using a back-hoe,
and (b) due to lack of suitable PPE for performing such an activity.
4. The probability of occurrence of Hazard 4, Workers falling into excavated pits has
a low value of 0.16 because appropriate safety procedures such as placing of safety
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cones along the length of the obstacles and excavated pits to avoid general public
or workers moving in closer proximities of the pits were followed.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Safety is of primary importance in any construction operation. Safe working
environment promotes the wellbeing of the crew, decreases equipment and infrastructure
damage and its associated costs. Although HDD construction method has helped with
urban infrastructure development, there is still a need to evaluate the practices in the
context of safety risk to workers, infrastructure and HDD equipment. To address this
limitation this study proposed and demonstrated the Hierarchical Risk Assessment
methodology using two HDD projects happened in the State of South Carolina. This
research has made a good attempt to evaluate the risk of HDD projects. Extended research
in this area in the near future will help in mitigating the safety risk further more.
The hierarchical risk assessment methodology entails the identification of specific
hazards, factors that influence the hazards and the project characteristics that aggravate the
safety risk characterized through the hazards and the influential factors. Four hazards, nine
factors and several project characteristics have been identified in this study to investigate
the safety risk of HDD projects; a review of case studies of accidents on past HDD projects
informed the selection of the hazards and factors in this study. Experts are surveyed to
quantify the influence of factors on the hazards and the characteristics on the factors using
the basic principles of analytical hierarchy process.
The hierarchical risk assessment methodology has been demonstrated on two mini
HDD projects which entailed installing small diameter pipelines in residential
communities. Findings demonstrated the utility of the proposed “Hierarchical Risk

71

Assessment” (HRA) Methodology in assessing the probabilities of occurrence of various
hazards on HDD projects. Furthermore, the evaluation process is easy and less time
consuming after required data inputs are obtained. Knowing the safety risk value, necessary
care can be taken to mitigate the hazards.

5.1

Limitations of the study:

1. A major limitation of this study is that the HRA methodology uses expert opinions alone
for determining the percentage influence values for factors influencing hazards and
characteristics influencing factors. And these opinions are subjective and lack evidence.
2. Another limitation is that responses from only five experts have been used to tabulate
the priority vectors that were later used in assessing the probabilities of occurrence of HDD
hazards. Basing the methodology on only five experts’ opinion may have not produced a
very reliable priority vectors.
3. The lack of consideration of other hazards that may be significant is another limitation.
The four hazards considered in this study are based on a brief review of the past HDD
accident histories and not many accidents are well reported with all the factors leading to
them clearly identified. Similarly, the factors used in this study may very well not be a
exhaustive list.
4. The demonstration of the methodology is also limited in terms of the size of the HDD
projects. The two case studies presented in this study are very small diameter (≤2 inches
diameter) service line installations, and more informative findings would have been
obtained if the methodology would have been demonstrated on HDD projects that installed
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large diameter pipelines. The methodology would also be more useful for large diameter
pipeline installation projects which are more intense.
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Questionnaire: Comparative Questionnaire Survey for factors influencing hazards.
1) Relative to the factor “Accuracy of Sub surface utility Engineering (SUE),” how
significantly will the factor “Experience of the worker on job site” contribute to the
occurrence of “Hitting other utilities” hazard.
a) Very high
(b) Somewhat high
(c) Equal
(d) Somewhat Low
(e) Very Low

2) Relative to the factor “Inappropriate/Lack of communication mechanism among the
crew,” how significantly will the factor “Accuracy of Sub surface utility Engineering
(SUE)” contribute to the occurrence of “Hitting other utilities” hazard.
a) Very high
(b) Somewhat high
(c) Equal
(d) Somewhat Low
(e) Very Low

3) Relative to the factor “Inappropriate/Lack of communication mechanism among the
crew,” how significantly will the factor “Experience of the worker on job site” contribute
to the occurrence of “Hitting other utilities” hazard.
a) Very high
(b) Somewhat high
(c) Equal
(d) Somewhat Low
(e) Very Low
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4) Relative to the factor “Age of the tools used for the HDD operation,” how significantly
will the factor “Experience of the worker on job site” contribute to the occurrence of
“Stall/breakage of drill string/drill head” hazard.
a) Very high
(b) Somewhat high
(c) Equal
(d) Somewhat Low
(e) Very Low

5) Relative to the factor “Exceeding the force limits of the drill rig,” how significantly will
the factor “Age of the tools used for the HDD operation” contribute to the occurrence of
“Stall/breakage of drill string/drill head” hazard.
a) Very high
(b) Somewhat high
(c) Equal
(d) Somewhat Low
(e) Very Low

6) Relative to the factor “Exceeding the force limits of the drill rig,” how significantly will
the factor “Experience of the worker on job site” contribute to the occurrence of
“Stall/breakage of drill string/drill head” hazard.
a) Very high
(b) Somewhat high
(c) Equal
(d) Somewhat Low
(e) Very Low
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7) Relative to the factor “Lack of PPE,” how significantly will the factor “Experience of
the worker on job site” contribute to the occurrence of “Injury to worker” hazard.
a) Very high
(b) Somewhat high
(c) Equal
(d) Somewhat Low
(e) Very Low

8) Relative to the factor “Experience of the worker on job site,” how significantly will the
factor “Lack of PPE” contribute to the occurrence of “Injury to worker” hazard.
a) Very high
(b) Somewhat high
(c) Equal
(d) Somewhat Low
(e) Very Low

9) Relative to the factor “Unsuitable apparel for the work conditions,” how significantly
will the factor “Experience of the worker on job site” contribute to the occurrence of
“Injury to worker” hazard.
a) Very high
(b) Somewhat high
(c) Equal
(d) Somewhat Low
(e) Very Low
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10) Relative to the factor “Inappropriate/Lack of communication mechanism among the
crew,” how significantly likely will the factor “Experience of the worker on job site”
contribute to the occurrence of “Workers falling into excavated Pits” hazard.
a) Very high
(b) Somewhat high
(c) Equal
(d) Somewhat Low
(e) Very Low

11) Relative to the factor “Lack of proper barricading around the pits and alarms,” how
significantly will the factor “Inappropriate/Lack of communication mechanism among the
crew” contribute to the occurrence of “Workers falling into excavated Pits” hazard.
a) Very high
(b) Somewhat high
(c) Equal
(d) Somewhat Low
(e) Very Low

12) Relative to the factor “Behavior and postures of the workers during the drilling
operation,” how significantly will the factor “Lack of proper barricading around the pits
and alarms” contribute to the occurrence of “Workers falling into excavated Pits” hazard.
a) Very high
(b) Somewhat high
(c) Equal
(d) Somewhat Low
(e) Very Low
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13) Relative to the factor “Behavior and postures of the workers during the drilling
operation,” how significantly likely will the factor “Experience of the worker on job site”
contribute to the occurrence of “Workers falling into excavated Pits” hazard.
a) Very high
(b) Somewhat high
(c) Equal
(d) Somewhat Low
(e) Very Low

14) Relative to the factor “Behavior and postures of the workers during the drilling
operation,” how significantly will the factor “Inappropriate/Lack of communication
mechanism among the crew” contribute to the occurrence of “Workers falling into
excavated pits” hazard.
a) Very high
(b) Somewhat high
(c) Equal
(d) Somewhat Low
(e) Very Low
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15) Relative to the factor “Experience of the worker on the job site,” how significantly will
the factor “Lack of proper barricading around the pits and alarms” contribute to the
occurrence of “Workers falling into excavated pits” hazard.
a) Very high
(b) Somewhat high
(c) Equal
(d) Somewhat Low
(e) Very Low
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Comparative Questionnaire Survey results for factors influencing hazards and characteristics influencing factors.

Table B.1. Comparative questionnaire survey results converted to quantitative numbers for factors influencing hazards H1, H2,
H3 and H4.
Hazard One (H1)

Hazard Two (H2)

Hazard Three (H3)

Hazard Four (H4)

F12

F23

F13

F14

F45

F15

F16

F67

F17

F13

F38

F89

F19

F18

F39

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

Q6

Q7

Q8

Q9

Q10

Q11

Q12

Q13

Q14

Q15

E1

1

0.5

3

0.33

0.5

0.5

0.5

1

1

0.5

0.5

1

0.5

0.5

1

E2

0.5

0.33

3

0.5

0.5

2

3

1

3

3

2

0.33

3

0.5

0.33

E3

1

3

0.33

2

0.33

2

0.5

2

0.5

3

0.5

0.5

1

0.33

0.33

E4

0.5

3

3

0.5

2

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

E5

0.3

2

2

0.5

0.5

0.33

3

3

2

0.5

0.5

0.33

1

0.3

3

∑(E1:E5)

3.3

8.83

11.3

3.83

3.83

5.16

7.33

7.33

6.83

7.33

3.83

2.49

5.83

1.96

2.29

Avg.(E1:E5)

0.66

1.76

2.26

0.76

0.76

1.03

1.46

1.46

1.36

1.46

0.76

0.49

1.16

0.39

0.45
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Table B.2. Comparative questionnaire survey results converted to quantitative numbers for characteristics influencing factors
F1, F2 and F3.
F1

F2

F3

C12

C23

C34

C14

C13

C24

C12

C23

C34

C14

C13

C24

C12

C23

C34

C14

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

Q6

Q7

Q8

Q9

Q10

Q11

Q12

Q13

Q14

Q15

Q16

E1

2

2

3

0.33

3

0.33

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

2

2

0.33

3

E2

0.5

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0.33

0.33

0.33

E3

2

0.5

0.33

2

0.5

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

2

0.5

2

E4

2

2

2

2

2

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

2

0.33

2

E5

2

2

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

5

0.33

0.33

0.5

∑(E1:E5)

8.5

6.83

7.66

6.66

7.83

6.66

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

0.5

6.66

1.82

7.83

Avg.(E1:E5)

1.7

1.36

1.53

0.33

1.56

1.33

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

1.7

1.33

0.36

1.56
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Table B.3. Comparative questionnaire survey results for characteristics influencing factors F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8 and F9.
F3

F4

F5

F6

F7

F8

F9

C13

C24

C12

C23

C34

C14

C13

C24

C12

C23

C13

C12

C12

C12

C12

C23

C13

Q17

Q18

Q19

Q20

Q21

Q22

Q23

Q24

Q25

Q26

Q27

Q28

Q29

Q30

Q31

Q32

Q33

E1

0.33

0.5

2

2

3

0.33

3

0.33

2

3

0.5

3

2

0.33

1

1

0.33

E2

2

2

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

3

2

2

0.33

0

0.33

1

0.33

0.5

E3

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.5

0.5

2

0.5

0

1

2

1

0.5

0.5

E4

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.5

2

0.33

0.33

1

0.5

2

2

0

2

2

0.5

2

0.5

E5

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33.

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.5

0.33

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

2

0.33

2

∑(E1:E5)

3.32

3.49

3.32

3.49

5.99

1.65

4.32

2.49

6.5

9.33

5.5

3.83

5.5

5.16

5.5

4.16

3.83

Avg.(E1:E5)

0.66

0.69

0.66

0.69

1.98

0.33

0.86

0.49

1.3

0.86

1.1

0.76

1.1

1.03

1.1

0.83

0.76

89

